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1. Introduction 
 
Due to strong growth in traffic volumes, an increasing number of airports are approaching their 
capacity limits. Unless timely investments on infrastructure are made, serious delays and congestions 
will threaten the long-term development of the aviation industry. The Airports Council International 
(ACI 2013) estimates that in the United States alone, airports’ capital need for 2013 through 2017 is 
$71.3 billion or $14.3 billion per year. Among the investment needed, 54% is intended to 
accommodate growth in passenger and cargo as well as larger aircraft, with the rest planned for the 
maintenance and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure. However, federal funding schemes, such as 
the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and the Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs), are insufficient 
for such investment requirements. The Transportation Research Board (TRB 2007) estimated that 
during the 2001-2004 period, only 21% and 11% of airports' capital were from AIP and PFC, 
respectively (see Zhang 2012 for discussion of changes in AIP and PFCs over time). In other markets, 
with the trend of privatization and commercialization, an increasing number of airports are now free 
from government subsidy or financial assistance, and turn to alternative financing options and revenue 
sources. Since airport investments are often lumpy (Oum and Zhang 1990), retained earnings are 
usually not sufficient. Many airports have chosen to work with airlines through various types of 
vertical arrangements (Fu et al. 2011).   
 
Airlines can contribute to airport capacity expansion in several ways, including direct/joint 
investments in infrastructure, or sharing financial risks so that the airport can bring in loans and 
reduce capital costs. For example, terminal 2 of Munich Airport is jointly invested by the airport 
operating company FMG (60%) and Lufthansa (40%). Profits generated from the terminal are shared 
by the two investors. Lufthansa has also been investing in Frankfurt Airport, and holds 29% share of 
Shanghai Pudong International Airport Cargo Terminal (Fu and Zhang, 2010). The Los Angeles 
International Airport is undergoing a $1.4 billion upgrade to be completed by 2016, in which 
Southwest Airlines is investing $400 million in terminal concourse, ticketing and baggage claim areas, 
security, and gate reorganizations. American, Delta, and United are also contributing $33 million, 
$229 million, and $412 million respectively for various projects.1   
 
In other cases, airlines contribute to infrastructure investments by sharing financial risks and thereby 
helping airports get loans at competitive interest rates. Airports and airlines enter into use-and-lease 
1  Information summarized at FlightGlobal, http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/airline-
business/2014/01/domestic-terminal-developments-lax/.  Similar arrangements can be observed in many other 
airports. For example, Southwest is investing $156 million to build the first international terminal and 
surrounding infrastructure at Houston Hobby Airport, which are to be completed in 2015. In other cases, a group 
of airlines may jointly invest in airport facilities. For example, twenty airlines formed SeaTac Fuel in 2000, 
which effectively monopolizes fuelling services at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Vancouver Airport 
Fuel Facilities Corporation (VAFFC) is owned by a consortium of commercial airlines serving the airport, and is 
planning to invest up to $100 million on a major expansion project to enhance its fuelling capacity.  
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contracts that specify the terms of and payment for airport facilities. The US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA 1999) notes that these agreements often form the foundation for airport 
financing, and can be grouped into three categories: compensatory, residual, and hybrid. Under a 
residual agreement, a carrier who signed the master use-and-lease agreement is awarded the so-called 
“signatory airline” status. These carriers pledge to pay any costs of operating the airport that are not 
allocated to non-signatory airlines or covered by non-aviation revenues. This allows an airport to 
transfer financial risks to its signatory carriers. 2 Many airports finance infrastructures by issuing 
revenue bonds. Residual agreements are often structured to provide bond investors with increased 
security, and accordingly, the terms of these contracts are usually longer than compensatory 
agreements. Since an airport is usually served by many signatory airlines, financial failures of 
individual carriers do not lead to disastrous outcomes to the airport. The US Department of 
Transportation (DOT 2003) noted that since the deregulation in 1978, more than 130 airlines filed for 
bankruptcy yet no airport revenue bond has defaulted. With financial risks reduced, many airports are 
able to finance investments at competitive rates. 
 
Airport bonds have become a major source of capital for the industry. By 1995, a total of $4.52 billion 
had been raised for the construction of the Denver International Airport, 76.5% of which was through 
airport revenue bonds (DIA 2014). Large airports tend to use bonds more extensively. During the 
1990s, general airport revenue bonds (GARBs) accounted for 36-70% of capital expenditures for US 
airports, or over $3 billion per year on average (FAA 1999). Bond issuance reached its peak in 2010, 
totaling $17.3 billion in revenue bonds and $1.2 billion in issuance for airline special facility bonds 
(DIA 2014).3 Service and financial commitments by signatory airlines are important determinants of 
bond ratings and yields. Airline-Airport Lease and Use Agreements (ALUA) are legally binding 
contracts specifying airlines’ obligations. When issuing airport facilities bonds in 2012, the Greater 
Orlando Aviation Authority (GOAA) revealed that even if a signatory airline is under bankruptcy 
protection and decides to reject the ALUA, the carrier is liable for the amounts unpaid prior to 
bankruptcy plus the greater of i) one year of rent or ii) 15% of the total remaining lease payments, not 
to exceed three years (GOAA 2012).  
 
In return for the investments committed and risks borne, signatory airlines are given varying degrees 
of influence over airport planning, operations and capital investments, and sometimes exclusive or 
2 In comparison, under a compensatory agreement, an airport charges its airline tenants fees and rental charges 
in an amount necessary to recover actual cost. Accordingly the airport assumes the financial risk of any overall 
revenue shortfall. Hybrid agreements combine elements of both the compensatory and residual agreements 
(FAA 1999). 
3 The Transportation Research Board (TRB 2007) defines four basic types of bonds that are issued to fund 
airport capital improvements, including i) general obligation bonds supported by the overall tax base of the 
issuing entity (the airport sponsor); ii) GARBs secured by the revenues of the airport and other revenues as may 
be defined in the bond indenture; iii) bonds backed either solely by PFC revenues or by PFC revenues and 
airport revenues generated by rentals, fees, and charges; and iv) special facility bonds backed solely by revenues 
from a facility constructed with proceeds of those bonds.  
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preferential facility use (Fu et al. 2010). Airport capital expenditures have to be approved by signatory 
airlines, except for projects required by a governmental authority (e.g. the FAA, the DOT), or 
facilities for which the tenants or users will be required to pay directly. Signatory airlines also receive 
various financial benefits. They often pay lower charges than non-signatory airlines under a residual 
agreement. In many cases, they also share proportions of airport revenue. The ALUA of the greater 
Orlando aviation authority entitles signatory airlines to share net revenues after the payment of debt 
and other fund requirements. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, 70% and 30% of net revenues were 
divided between the airport and signatory airlines, respectively (GOAA 2012). Revenue sharing 
arrangements have also been used in airports such as Tampa, Charleroi and Munich, among others (Fu 
and Zhang 2010).   
 
In summary, airlines can contribute to airport capacity through direct/joint investments, or to share 
financial risks thus that airports can finance projects with reduced capital costs. In return, signatory 
airlines are given varying degrees of influence over airport operations, capacity investments, and 
resource allocation. They may also be compensated financially, either through revenue sharing, or 
indirectly through discounted airport charges or preferential facility use. Airlines now play important 
roles in airport investments. AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines, alone had $3.2 
billion of debt backing airport facilities as of 2011.4  
 
In recent years, airlines’ involvements in airport operation and development have attracted 
considerable regulatory attention, yet no consensus has been reached on the optimal policy towards 
airport-airline vertical arrangements. The FAA expressed concerns over favorable terms offered by an 
airport to a particular airline, because this may harm competition in the downstream airline markets 
(FAA 1999). Andreas Kopp, the chief economist of OECD/ECMT (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development / The European Conference of Ministers of Transport) claimed that 
market power creates rents to an airport and dominant airline(s). He argued that airline dominance “is 
bound to lead to under-investment in airport capacity. As (private or public) airport developers do not 
receive the full marginal value product of airport investment, due to the sharing of rents with 
dominant airlines, they will tend to under-invest in airport capacity” (ECMT 2003). This argument, 
however, has not recognized the possibility that airline cooperation and commitments may reduce 
airports’ capital costs. In addition, although airport capacity limit may help dominant airlines to 
achieve higher yields, it also prevents hub carriers from developing extensive hub-and-spoke 
networks. Therefore, an airline’s preference for airport expansion may be dependent on market 
conditions, as evidenced by mixed observations in the aviation industry. The US Department of 
Transport (DOT 2001) concluded that “to the extent dominant hub carriers have market power, they 
can not only charge higher prices, but also control capacity, keep it at a lower level than would prevail 
in a competitive market.” Dresner et al. (2002) found that the lack of airport capacity may form entry 
barriers to airlines who wish to initiate services. On the other hand, there are many cases in which hub 
carriers support airport capacity expansion. British Airways and Cathay Pacific, for example, 
4  Bloomberg report “AMR-Backed Municipal Airport Debt Falls on American Air Parent Bankruptcy”, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/amr-backed-municipal-airport-debt-falls-on-american-air-parent-
bankruptcy.html 
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supported capacity expansion projects in Heathrow Airport and Hong Kong International Airport, 
respectively. Rod Eddington, Chief Executive of British Airways, stated that “British Airways’ 
development as a global network carrier has underpinned the success of the British aviation industry 
and the lack of capacity at Heathrow hits us hard” (Eddington 2003). In general, the effects of airport-
airline vertical arrangements on airport capacity remain unclear. 
 
Quite a few economic studies examined investments on airport infrastructures (see, for example, 
Zhang and Zhang 2003, 2006, 2010, Oum et al. 2004, Forsyth 2005, 2007, Basso and Zhang 2007a, 
Zhang 2010). However, airport-airline arrangements have not been explicitly considered in capacity 
choices, and no study has formally modeled possible savings in airport capital costs brought by airline 
cooperation. The emerging literature on airport-airline vertical arrangements has mostly focused on 
airline competition and traffic volumes (see, for example, Fu and Zhang 2010, Zhang et al. 2010, 
Barbot 2009, 2011, Barbot et al. 2013, D'Alfonso and Nastasi 2012, D'Alfonso et al. 2013, Sarmento 
and Brandao 2013), risk sharing between an airport and its airlines (Hihara 2011, 2012, Starkie 2012, 
D'Alfonso and Nastasi 2012), factors influencing the formation of such arrangements (Yang et al. 
2014), and forms of vertical arrangements (Starkie 2008, Fu et al. 2010).5 Therefore, these studies do 
not directly examine the effects and mechanisms through which airlines influence airport capacity. In 
particular, Yang et al. (2014) analyze airport-airline revenue sharing in a bargaining game. Their 
analytical results suggest that when an airport cannot make an exclusive arrangement with one airline 
and when lump-sum payments cannot be arranged, the airport and airlines cannot mutually benefit at 
the same time. Such results however cannot fully explain the increased use of vertical arrangements in 
the aviation industry. Complementary results may be obtained by developing models that incorporate 
capital cost savings brought by airport-airline cooperation, and airlines’ influence on airport capacity 
choice.   
 
Another recent area of research is the treatment of demand uncertainty in airport capacity choice. 
Empirical investigations have shown that there is substantial volatility in airport traffic volumes (e.g., 
Maldonaldo 1990, De Neufville and Barber 1991), and significant forecast biases are present even at 
national level (De Neufville and Odoni, 2003). However, only a few economic studies have formally 
modeled such uncertainty. Xiao et al. (2013) analyze the effects of demand uncertainty on airport 
capacity choices, and conclude that uncertainty will not change capacity choice if demand variation is 
low and capacity cost is high; otherwise the optimal airport capacity under demand uncertainty will be 
larger than the case when a deterministic mean demand is considered.  
 
The present study aims to make both methodological and policy contributions to the literature. To the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first study that simultaneously considers airport-airline vertical 
arrangements, airline competition, and airport capacity choice in the presence of demand uncertainty.6 
5 See D'Alfonso and Nastasi (2014) for a recent survey of the literature. For comprehensive literature surveys on 
airport pricing and capacity investment using a “vertical structure” approach, see Basso and Zhang (2007b) and 
Zhang and Czerny (2012). 
6 Although Sarmento and Brandao (2013) examined the effects of airport-airline profit sharing on a (profit-
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Such an approach allows us to investigate the interactions of airports and airlines in an integrated 
model, and their implications to airport capacity and social welfare. Modeling results from such a 
study will offer valuable insights into the debates over such important policy questions as: What is 
dominant airlines’ preference over airport capacity investments; When can airport-airline vertical 
arrangements facilitate airport expansion; Whether can airports and airlines achieve win-win 
outcomes that are also welfare-improving; or does government regulation have to be introduced to 
achieve Pareto improvements? These questions are investigated through a multistage game, in which 
an airport chooses its capacity given the vertical arrangements with its signatory airlines in the 
presence of demand uncertainty, and the airport may maximize its profit or social welfare. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic economic model. Section 
3 and Section 4 analyze the cases of a profit-maximizing airport and a welfare-maximizing airport, 
respectively. The last section summarizes and concludes this study.    
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider an airport served by two signatory airlines, say airline 1 and 2. These two airlines 
provide homogenous services at the airport, and have identical constant marginal cost c. Using a 
similar specification as in Xiao et al. (2013), the inverse demand function of airlines is   
 
𝑃 = 𝑋 − 𝑏𝑄      ( 𝑏 > 0)   ,            (1) 
 
where P is airfare paid by passengers, Q =  𝑞1 + 𝑞2 is total traffic volume at the airport, and X is a 
random variable that captures the demand forecast’s margin of error. Let 𝑓(𝑥) be the density function 
of X, and 𝐹(𝑥) be the corresponding distribution function. For modeling tractability, X is assumed to 
follow a uniform distribution in the interval ( 𝑥, 𝑥 ), and so 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/(𝑥 − 𝑥). Airlines have reached 
an agreement with the airport, thus that each signatory airline contributes a proportion s of the capital 
needed for airport capacity investment, and in exchange shares a proportion s of the airport’s revenue. 
That is, the airport and airlines may be regarded as partners in a joint venture for capacity investment. 
Commitments from signatory airlines reduce the risk of capacity investment, and so capital cost is 
reduced by δ per cent. On average, the airport derives a profit h from commercial services per 
passenger and the associated consumer surplus is v. Both h and v are assumed to be positive and 
exogenously determined.7  
 
The airport and airlines’ behavior is modeled as a multi-stage game: 
• Stage 1: The airport decides the capacity, K, to be invested based on the distribution of 
demand shifter 𝑓(𝑥). With discounted capital cost (1 − 𝛿)𝑟, the cost of airport capacity is 
maximizing) airport’s incentives to invest, the investment did not specifically refer to capacity investment, nor 
was airport demand uncertainty considered in their analysis. 
7 For alternative modeling of concession services, see Czerny (2006, 2013) and Yang and Zhang (2011). 
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 (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾. 
• Stage 2: Conditional on the capacity installed and the observed demand x, the airport sets its 
service charge 𝜔. 
• Stage 3: The airlines compete in Cournot fashion to maximize their respective profits. 
 
To solve for the optimal capacity K, we first consider Stage 3, in which the objective of signatory 
airline i (i = 1,2) is specified as follows: 
 max𝑞𝑖 𝜋𝑖 |𝑥,𝜔,𝐾 = (𝑃 − 𝑐 − 𝜔)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑠[(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾] (2) 
   s. t.    0 ≤ Q = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 ≤ 𝐾,     𝑖 = 1 , 2 .        
 
The corresponding Lagrangian function with multipliers 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑖 can be specified as 𝐿𝑖(𝑞𝑖,𝑢𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) =(𝑃 − 𝑐 − 𝜔)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑠�(𝑤 + ℎ)𝑄 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾� + 𝜇𝑖𝑄 − 𝜆𝑖(𝑄 − 𝐾)  , which leads to following first-
order condition (FOC)  
 
𝜕𝐿𝑖(𝑞𝑖,𝑢𝑖,𝜆𝑖)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 𝑋 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐 − (1 − 𝑠)𝜔 + sh + 𝜇𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2.   (3) 
 
Equilibrium results can be obtained depending on whether capacity constraints are binding. 
 
Case 1. If capacity constraint Q ≥ 0 in eq. (2) is binding, then 𝑞i = 0 , 𝜆𝑖 = 0, and  𝜇𝑖 ≥ 0. 
With eq. (3) we have  
𝜇𝑖 = −(x − c − (1 − s)𝜔 + sh) ≥ 0  →  ω ≥ 11−𝑠 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ).        (4) 
This corresponds to the extreme case when airport charge is so high that airlines leave the market, and 
thus airport’s traffic volume at equilibrium is  𝑄1∗ = 0. 
 
Case 2. If capacity constraint Q ≤ K is binding, then Q = K, 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0, and  𝜇𝑖 = 0. Moreover, 
the symmetry of airlines implies that their outputs are the same, or  𝑞i = 𝐾2 . The associated FOC 
implies that  
𝜆𝑖 = 𝑥 − 32 𝑏𝐾 − 𝑐 − (1 − 𝑠)𝜔 + 𝑠ℎ ≥ 0   →     𝜔 ≤ 11−𝑠 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 32 𝑏𝐾�.    (5) 
In this case, the airport’s service charge is low and demand is high. Airport capacity is fully utilized, 
and so traffic volume at equilibrium is  𝑄2∗ = 𝐾  
 
Case 3. If neither capacity constraint is binding, or 0 < Q < 𝐾 and  𝜇𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖 = 0, with airlines 
symmetry and associated FOCs, the output of each airline can be obtained as  
𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 13𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 − (1 − 𝑠)𝜔 + 𝑠ℎ).       (6) 
The condition 0 < Q < 𝐾 implies that  
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1
1−𝑠
�𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 3
2
𝑏𝐾� < 𝜔 < 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ).      (7) 
 
This corresponds to the case when the airport’s service charge is neither too low nor too high with 
respect to the actual demand observed, and the invested capacity is partially utilized. It can be derived 
that the total traffic volume at the airport is 𝑄3∗ = 23𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 − (1 − 𝑠)𝜔 + 𝑠ℎ). 
 
The solutions for Stage 3 will be used repeatedly in the following sections, and are summarized in the 
following proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: Conditional on airport capacity K, airport service charge ω, and observed demand 
level x,  
i. if the airport charge is too high relative to travel demand, in the sense that  𝜔 ≥ 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ) 
in our model, signatory airlines will stay away from the market thus 𝑄∗ = 0 , and airlines’ profits 
equal zero  𝜋𝑖∗ = 0 , 𝑖 = 1,2 . 
ii. if the airport charge is quite low relative to travel demand, in the sense that  𝜔 ≤ 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 +
𝑠ℎ −
3
2
𝑏𝐾) in our model, airport capacity is fully utilized and 𝑄∗ = 𝑄2∗ = 𝐾. The profit of airline i  
(𝑖 = 1,2 )  is  
𝜋𝑖
∗ = (𝑥−𝑏𝑄2∗−𝑐−𝜔)𝑄2∗
2
+ 𝑠�(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄2∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾�     (8) 
iii. if relative to travel demand, the airport charge is neither too low nor too high in the sense that  
1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 3
2
𝑏𝐾) < 𝜔 < 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ) in our model, the airport capacity is partially 
utilized and 𝑄 = 𝑄3∗ = 23𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 − (1 − 𝑠)𝜔 + 𝑠ℎ), The profit of airline i  (𝑖 = 1,2 )  is 
𝜋𝑖
∗ = (𝑥−𝑏𝑄3∗−𝑐−𝜔)𝑄3∗
2
+ 𝑠�(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄3∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾�      (9) 
 
3. Decisions of a Profit-Maximizing Airport 
 
This section considers the price and capacity decisions made by a profit-maximizing airport. In Stage 
2 of our three-stage game, the airport chooses its service charge ω to maximize its profit, given the 
airport capacity and observed demand level. Its decision problem can be specified as 
 max𝜔 𝛱|𝑥,𝐾 = (1 − 2𝑠)[(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾]     (10) 
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By Proposition 1, the airport’s profit conditional on capacity invested K and observed demand x can 
be further specified as follows, where 𝑄3∗ is the airport traffic volume (i.e. derived demand) defined in 
the proposition. 
 
𝛱|𝑥,𝐾 =  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ −(1 − 2𝑠)(1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾                                   when                  ω ≥ 11−𝑠 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ)(1 − 2𝑠)��(𝜔 + ℎ)𝐾 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾��        when   ω ≤ 1
1−𝑠
�𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 3
2
𝑏𝐾�(1 − 2𝑠)��(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄3∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾��                                                                                                                    when  ω ∈ ( 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 3
2
𝑏𝐾), 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ))
   (11) 
 
To focus on non-trivial solutions, it is assumed that 𝑥 > 𝑐 − h , so that positive traffic volume is 
possible when the demand shifter takes the lowest possible value. The FOCs of the airport’s profit 
maximization problem lead to the following conclusions: 
 
Proposition 2: Conditional on airport capacity K, the optimal airport charge of a profit-maximizing 
airport can be determined as follows (subscript “p” denoting profit-maximization): 
(i) If 𝑥 ≥ 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾 , the airport’s maximum profit 𝛱𝑝∗ = 𝛱𝑝,2∗   is achieved when its service 
charge is set as  
𝜔𝑝
∗ = 𝜔𝑝,2∗ = 11−𝑠 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 32 𝑏𝐾�            (12) 
(ii) Otherwise if 𝑥 < 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾 , the airport’s maximum profit 𝛱𝑝∗ = 𝛱𝑝,3∗   is achieved when 
its service charge is set as 
𝜔𝑝
∗ = 𝜔𝑝,3∗ = 12(1−𝑠) (𝑥 − 𝑐 + (2𝑠 − 1)ℎ)   (13) 
  
Now consider the airport’s decision in Stage 1, when it maximizes its expected profit by choosing 
capacity based on the probability distribution of future demand: 
 max𝐾   𝐸𝛱 = 𝐸 (1 − 2𝑠)[(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾]                            (14) 
 
where Q and ω are the derived demand of the airport in Stage 3 and its optimal charge in Stage 2, 
respectively. For ease of notation, two critical values are defined  
𝐾𝐶𝑉1
𝑝 = 1
3𝑏
�𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ�   (15.1) 
 𝐾𝐶𝑉2𝑝 = 13𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ)     (15.2) 
Then the expected profit can be further specified as: 
Case I. If 𝐾 ≥ 𝐾𝐶𝑉2
𝑝  which implies 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾, the expected profit of the airport is EΠ = ∫ Πp,3∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥 . It can be shown that 𝑑𝑑𝐾 EΠ = −(1 − s)(1 − δ)r < 0, and thus the optimal 
capacity is 
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𝐾𝑝
∗ = 𝐾𝑝,1∗ = 13𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ)      (16) 
 
Case II. If 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾𝐶𝑉1
𝑝  which implies 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾 , the expected profit is EΠ =
∫ Πp,2∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥 . By the first-order condition 𝑑𝑑𝐾 EΠ = 0 the following results can be obtained: 
(II.a) if  r > 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) , the airport does not invest any capacity, i.e., 
𝐾𝑝
∗ = 𝐾𝑝,1∗ = 0      (17) 
 
(II.b) if  𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) , the optimal airport capacity is 
𝐾𝑝
∗ = 𝐾𝑝,2∗ = 13𝑏 �𝑥+𝑥2 − 𝑐 + ℎ − (1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝛿)𝑟�   (18) 
 
(II.c) if  r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) , the optimal airport capacity is 
 𝐾𝑝∗ = 𝐾𝑝,2∗ = 13𝑏 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ�    (19) 
 
Case III. If 𝐾𝐶𝑉1
𝑝 < 𝐾 < 𝐾𝐶𝑉2𝑝 , which implies that 𝑥 < 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾 < 𝑥, the expected profit 
is EΠ = ∫ Πp,3∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ Πp,2∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑥�𝑥 , where 𝑥� = 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾 . By the first-order condition 
𝑑
𝑑𝐾
EΠ = 0 it can be derived that if r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿), the optimal airport capacity is 
𝐾𝑝
∗ = 𝐾𝑝,3∗ = 13𝑏 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ − �2𝑟(1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝛿)(𝑥 − 𝑥)�   (20) 
Otherwise, there is no optimal capacity for the airport in this case. 
 
Comparing the airport’s profits across different cases, the optimal capacity can be obtained as in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: For a profit-maximizing airport, 
(i) if  r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) , the  optimal capacity is 
𝐾𝑝
∗ = 𝐾𝑝,3∗ = 13𝑏 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ − �2𝑟(1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝛿)(𝑥 − 𝑥)�  (21) 
(ii) if  𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿), the  optimal capacity is 
𝐾𝑝
∗ = 𝐾𝑝,2∗ = 13𝑏 �𝑥+𝑥2 − 𝑐 + ℎ − (1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝛿)𝑟�   (22) 
(iii) if  r > 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿), the  optimal capacity is 0 (no capacity is invested).  
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It is clear that the optimal capacity 𝐾𝑝∗ of a profit-maximizing airport increases with both s and 𝛿 (i.e. 
𝜕𝐾𝑝
∗
𝜕𝑠
≥ 0 and 𝜕𝐾𝑝∗
𝜕𝛿
≥ 0, where equality is possible at border conditions). That is, vertical cooperation 
increases airport capacity. The airport does not receive the full marginal product of investment as 
pointed out by ECMT (2003). However, effective airport charges are reduced, which leads to higher 
outputs by signatory airlines. Saving in capital cost (i.e. δ) promotes capacity investments further, and 
improves the airport’s profit too (i.e. 𝜕Π𝑝∗
𝜕𝛿
≥ 0). The sign of  𝜕Π𝑝∗
𝜕𝑠
 however depends on many parameters 
and cannot be determined. Intuitively, revenue sharing has a two-way effect on an airport’s profit. On 
the one hand, it encourages airlines to produce more outputs. On the other hand, a lower proportion of 
profit will be left for the airport. The net effect on airport profit is thus dependent on market and other 
conditions. 
 
The effect of demand uncertainty on capacity is intuitive. If capital cost is very high relative to travel 
demand (r > 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) in our model), the airport will not invest in any capacity. Otherwise, if capital 
cost is low relative to travel demand (in our model r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿)  ), the airport will invest in 
substantial capacity even if it may be partially utilized in the future. If capital cost is moderate (i.e.  
𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) ), the same amount of capacity will be invested as in the case of a 
deterministic mean demand (i.e. when  𝑥 = (𝑥 + 𝑥)/2). The airport charge is set to the level when 
invested capacity is just fully utilized.  
 
In the multistage game, the proportion of airline investment and shared revenue, s, is treated as a fixed 
value (exogenously given). However, it is unclear whether an airport and its airlines are willing to 
enter into the vertical arrangements at the first place. That is, it is unclear if an incentive-compatible 
agreement can be reached, or if win-win cooperation can be arranged between the airport and its 
airlines without intervention from a third party (e.g. government). Note that absent a vertical 
arrangement, 𝑠 = 0 and 𝛿 = 0. An incentive-compatible agreement may be reached if for both the 
airport and the airlines, their expected profits under such an agreement are higher than those without, 
or  E Πp∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) − E Πp∗ (0,0) ≥ 0      (23.1) E πi,p∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) − E πi,p∗ (0,0) ≥ 0,          𝑖 = 1,2,   (23.2) 
These profit functions have complex step-wise specifications which are conditional on capital cost 
and demand variability. For example, if r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) , then  E πi,p∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) =
∫ �
�𝑥−𝑏𝑄3
∗−𝑐−𝜔𝑝,3∗ �𝑄3∗
2
+ 𝑠 ��ωp,3∗ + ℎ�𝑄3∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾𝑝,3∗ �� 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ ��𝑥−𝑏𝑄2∗−𝑐−𝜔𝑝,2∗ �𝑄2∗2 +𝑥𝑥�∗𝑥�∗𝑥
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𝑠 ��ωp,2∗ + ℎ�𝑄2∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾𝑝,3∗ �� 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 ,  
where 𝑥�∗ = 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾𝑝,3∗ . Otherwise, if r ≥ 𝑥−𝑥2(1−𝑠)(1−𝛿) , then E πi,p∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) = ∫ ��𝑥−𝑏𝑄2∗−𝑐−𝜔𝑝,2∗ �𝑄2∗2 + 𝑠 ��ωp,2∗ + ℎ�𝑄2∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾𝑝,2∗ �� 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥 .  
The closed-form solutions cannot be obtained even for some simplified special cases. We have carried 
extensive numerical simulations, which confirm that there are feasible values of s that satisfy eq. (23.1) 
and eq. (23.2) simultaneously. However, no clear relationship can be identified between s and other 
parameters such as r and δ, and the shapes of feasible areas are fairly sensitive to the values of other 
parameters. It seems that whether win-win arrangements can be reached between airports and airlines 
is conditional on particular market situations.  Some of the simulation results are reported in the 
Appendix.  
 
4. Decisions of a Welfare-Maximizing Airport 
 
This section considers the price and capacity decisions by a welfare-maximizing airport. In Stage 2, 
conditional on the capacity invested K, social welfare is calculated as follows 
 
𝑆𝑊 =
∫ 𝑃(𝑦,𝑋)𝑑𝑦𝑄0 − 𝑃𝑄 + 𝑣𝑄 + ∑ �(𝑃 − 𝑐 − 𝜔)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑠�(𝜔 + ℎ)𝑄 − (1 −                    𝛿)𝑟𝐾�� +2𝑖=1 (1 −2𝑠𝜔+ℎ𝑄−1−𝛿𝑟𝐾                                  (24) 
 
Thus, the decision problem of the airport can be specified as max𝜔 𝑆𝑊|𝑥,𝐾 = −12 𝑏𝑄2 + (𝑥 + ℎ + 𝑣 − 𝑐)𝑄 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾,   (25) 
By Proposition 1, welfare can be calculated conditional on capacity invested K and observed demand 
x as in eq. (26), where 𝑄3∗ is the airport traffic volume as defined in the proposition. 
 
𝑆𝑊|𝑥,𝐾 = 
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ −(1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾                                                           when               𝜔 ≥ 11−𝑠 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ)
−
1
2
𝑏𝐾2 + (𝑥 + ℎ + 𝑣 − 𝑐)𝐾 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾    when 𝜔 ≤ 1
1−𝑠
�𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 3
2
𝑏𝐾�
−
1
2
𝑏𝑄3
∗2 + (𝑥 + ℎ + 𝑣 − 𝑐)𝑄3∗2 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾      when                                                                                                𝜔 ∈ ( 1
1−𝑠
�𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ − 3
2
𝑏𝐾� , 1
1−𝑠
(𝑥 − 𝑐 + 𝑠ℎ))
         (26) 
 
 
To focus on non-trivial solutions, it is assumed that 𝑥 > 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑣, thus that positive traffic volume is 
possible even if the demand shifter takes the lowest possible value. The FOCs of eq. (25) lead to the 
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following conclusions as summarized in Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4: Conditional on airport capacity K, the optimal airport charge of a welfare-maximizing 
airport can be determined as follows (subscript “w” for welfare-maximization): 
(i) If x < 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑣 + 𝑏𝐾, the airport’s optimal service charge, and corresponding social 
welfare are 
𝜔𝑤
∗ = 𝜔𝑤,3∗ = − 12(1 − 𝑠) (𝑥 − 𝑐 − 2𝑠ℎ + 3ℎ + 3𝑣),                     (27) 
𝑆𝑊𝑤
∗ = 𝑆𝑊𝑤,3∗ = 12𝑏 (𝑥 + ℎ + 𝑣 − 𝑐)2 − 𝑟(1 − 𝛿)𝐾.                  (28) 
 
(ii) Otherwise if x ≥ c − h − v + bK, any charge satisfying ω𝑤∗ ≤ 1(1−𝑠) �𝑥 − 𝑐 − 𝑠ℎ − 32 𝑏𝐾� will 
lead to full utilization of airport capacity, and the  following maximum welfare  
𝑆𝑊𝜔
∗ = 𝑆𝑊𝜔,2∗ = −12 𝑏𝐾2 + (𝑥 + ℎ + 𝑣 − 𝑐)𝐾 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾 (29) 
 
Now consider the airport’s decision in Stage 1, when it maximizes the expected welfare by choosing 
capacity based on the probability distribution of future demand:  max𝐾 𝐄 𝑆𝑊 = 𝐸 �− 12 𝑏𝑄2 + (𝑥 + ℎ + 𝑣 − 𝑐)𝑄 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾�.                    (30) 
For ease of notation, the following two critical values are defined  
𝐾𝐶𝑉1
𝑤 = 1
𝑏
�𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣�   (31.1) 
 𝐾𝐶𝑉2𝑤 = 1𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣)     (31.2) 
The optimal capacity of the welfare-maximizing airport can be derived as follows: 
 
Case I. If K ≥ 𝐾𝐶𝑉2𝑤  which implies 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐 − ℎ + 𝑣 + 𝑏𝐾 , the expected welfare is E 𝑆𝑊 =
∫ SWw,3∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 𝑥𝑥 . It can be shown that 𝑑𝑑𝐾 𝐸 𝑆𝑊 = −(1 − δ)r < 0, and thus the optimal capacity is 
𝐾𝑤
∗ = 𝐾𝑤,1∗ = 𝐾𝐶𝑉2𝑤 = 1𝑏 (𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣)    (32) 
Case II. If K ≥ 𝐾𝐶𝑉1𝑤  which implies 𝑥 ≥ 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑣 + 𝑏𝐾, the expected welfare is 𝐸 𝑆𝑊 =
∫ SWω,2∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 𝑥𝑥 . By the FOC 𝑑𝑑𝐾 𝐸 𝑆𝑊 = 0, the following results can be obtained: 
(II.a) if  r > 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ+2𝑣
2(1−𝛿)  , the airport does not invest any capacity, or 
𝐾𝑤
∗ = 𝐾𝑤,1∗ = 0     (33) 
 
(II.b) if  𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿) ≤ r ≤ 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ+2𝑣2(1−𝛿)  , the optimal airport capacity is 
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𝐾𝑤
∗ = 𝐾𝑤,2∗ = 1𝑏 �𝑥+𝑥2 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟�   (34) 
 
(II.c) if  r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿) , the optimal airport capacity is 
 𝐾𝑤∗ = 𝐾𝑤,2∗ = 𝐾𝐶𝑉1𝑤 = 1𝑏 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣�    (35) 
 
Case III. If 𝐾𝐶𝑉1𝑤 < 𝐾 < 𝐾𝐶𝑉2𝑤  which implies that 𝑥 < 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑣 + 𝑏𝐾 < 𝑥 , the expected 
welfare is 𝐸 𝑆𝑊 = ∫ SWw,3∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ SWw,2∗ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥  𝑥𝑥�  𝑥�𝑥 , where 𝑥� = 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑣 + 𝑏𝐾. By the FOC 
that 𝑑
𝑑𝐾
𝐸 𝑆𝑊 = 0, it can be shown that if r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿), the optimal airport capacity is 
𝐾𝑤
∗ = 𝐾𝑤,3∗ = 1𝑏 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣 − �2𝑟(1 − 𝛿)(𝑥 − 𝑥)�   (36) 
Otherwise if 𝑟 ≥ 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿), there is no optimal capacity for the airport in this case. 
 
Comparing welfare levels across the above cases, the optimal capacities can be obtained and are 
summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: For a welfare-maximizing airport, 
(i) if  r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿), the  optimal capacity is 
𝐾𝑤
∗ = 𝐾𝑤,3∗ = 1𝑏 �𝑥 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣 − �2𝑟(1 − 𝛿)(𝑥 − 𝑥)�  (37) 
(ii) if  𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿) ≤ r ≤ 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ+2𝑣2(1−𝛿) , the  optimal capacity is 
𝐾𝑤
∗ = 𝐾𝑤,2∗ = 1𝑏 �𝑥+𝑥2 − 𝑐 + ℎ + 𝑣 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟�   (38) 
(iii) if  r > 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ+2𝑣
2(1−𝛿) , the optimal capacity is 0 or no capacity should be invested.  
 
Similar to the case of a profit-maximizing airport, the optimal capacity 𝐾𝑤∗  of a welfare-maximizing 
airport increases with 𝛿 (i.e. 𝜕𝐾𝑤
∗
𝜕𝛿
≥ 0, where equality is possible at border conditions). The intuition is 
that the savings in capital cost lead to higher capacity, which accommodates possible high demand in 
the future. However, optimal capacity 𝐾𝑤∗  is not influenced by airport-airline arrangements (i.e. 
𝜕𝐾𝑤
∗
𝜕𝑠
= 0). Similar results can be found for expected welfare, or 𝜕𝐸𝑆𝑊𝑤∗
𝜕𝛿
≥ 0 and 𝜕𝐸𝑆𝑊𝑤∗
𝜕𝑠
= 0. Intuitively, 
vertical arrangements (represented by parameter s) and airport charge (represented by parameter ω) 
influence surplus distribution between the airport and its airlines. However, surplus allocation does 
not change the airport’s capacity choice, which is set to maximize expected welfare (total surplus).  
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Demand uncertainty has similar effects as in the case of profit-maximizing airport.  If capital cost is 
very high relative to travel demand (r > 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ+2𝑣
2(1−𝛿)  in our model), the airport will not invest any 
capacity. Otherwise, if capital cost is very low relative to travel demand (in our model r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿) ), 
the airport will invest a lot even if the capacity may be partially utilized in the future. If the airport 
capital cost is moderate (i.e. 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿) ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑥+𝑥−2𝑐+2ℎ+2𝑣2(1−𝛿)  ), a welfare-maximizing airport will invest 
the same amount of capacity as in the case of a deterministic mean demand (i.e. when 𝑥 = (𝑥 + 𝑥)/2).  
 
To ensure that incentive-compatible agreements can be reached, or win-win cooperation can be 
arranged between an airport and its airlines without government intervention, the following conditions 
are to be satisfied, which require that expected welfare and signatory airlines’ profits should be larger 
with the agreement than the case without: 
 E 𝑆𝑊𝑤∗(𝑠, 𝛿) − E 𝑆𝑊𝑤∗(0,0) ≥ 0 ≥ 0      (39.1) E πi,w∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) − E πi,w∗ (0,0) ≥ 0,      𝑖 = 1,2,   (39.2) 
 
These functions have complex step-wise specifications conditional on capital cost and demand 
variability. For example, it can be shown that if r < 𝑥−𝑥
2(1−𝛿) , then  E 𝜋𝑖,𝑤∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) =
∫ �
�𝑥−𝑏𝑄3
∗−𝑐−𝜔𝑤,3∗ �𝑄3∗
2
+ 𝑠 ��ωw,3∗ + ℎ�𝑄3∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾𝑤,3∗ �� 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +𝑥�∗𝑥                            𝑥∗𝑥𝑥−𝑏𝑄2∗−𝑐−𝜔𝑤,2∗𝑄2∗2+𝑠ωw,2∗+ℎ𝑄2∗−1−𝛿𝑟𝐾𝑤,3∗𝑓𝑥𝑑𝑥       (40.1) 
 where 𝑥�∗ = 𝑐 − ℎ + 3𝑏𝐾𝑤,3∗ .  Otherwise if r ≥ 𝑥−𝑥2(1−𝛿) , then  E πi,𝑤∗ (𝑠, 𝛿) = ∫ ��𝑥−𝑏𝑄2∗−𝑐−𝜔𝑤,2∗ �𝑄2∗2 + 𝑠 ��ω𝑤,2∗ + ℎ�𝑄2∗ − (1 − 𝛿)𝑟𝐾𝑤,2∗ �� 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥      (40.2)                                                                                              
 
Closed form solutions cannot be obtained. Our extensive numerical simulations show that there are 
feasible values of s that satisfy these two equations simultaneously. However, no clear relationship 
among parameters r, s and δ can be identified, suggesting that the availability of win-win cooperation 
between airports and airlines depends on various parameters. Some of the simulation results are 
reported in the Appendix. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
To accommodate strong growth in traffic volume in coming years, substantial investments in airport 
infrastructure are needed. Airlines nowadays play an important role in airport capacity expansion, 
either through direct/joint investments, or through risk sharing which helps airports raise capital at 
competitive rates. In return, these airlines are given varying degrees of influence over airport planning, 
investments, and operations. They also receive financial benefits, either directly in the form of 
revenue sharing, or indirectly through airport charge discounts or preferential facility use. However, 
the effects of airport-airline cooperation on airport capacity choices remain unclear. No consensus has 
been reached with respect to the appropriate policy toward such vertical arrangements.  
 
This study aims to fill this gap in the research by developing a multistage model, in which competing 
airlines contribute to capacity investments, and share airport revenue proportional to their respective 
capital commitments. The proposed model simultaneously considers airport-airline vertical 
arrangements, airline competition, and airport capacity choice in the presence of demand uncertainty. 
Our analytical results suggest that for a profit-maximizing airport, such a vertical arrangement leads to 
higher capacity although its profit may not be higher. For a welfare-maximizing airport, such an 
arrangement has no effect on capacity or social welfare. Capital cost savings brought by airport-airline 
cooperation, if any, always lead to higher capacity, higher profit for a profit-maximizing airport, and 
higher welfare in the case of a welfare-maximizing airport. Numerical simulations reveal that win-win 
outcomes may be achieved for an airport and its airlines (and thus airport-airline vertical 
arrangements may be sustained) without government intervention.   
 
These results are broadly consistent with previous studies on airport-airline vertical arrangements, 
which in general conclude that such arrangements may increase welfare and traffic volume by 
internalizing the positive demand externality between aeronautical services and concession services. 
Our capacity-enhancing results is also consistent with Sarmento and Brandao (2013) who show that 
airport-airline profit sharing may display the highest incentive for an airport to invest when compared 
to alternative vertical relations when the airport maximizes profit. In addition, our findings are 
consistent with several recent studies on “light-handed” airport regulation, 8  which identified 
commercial agreements between airlines and airports as a source of efficiency and welfare gains 
(Forsyth 2004, 2008, Littlechild 2012a, 2012b, Yang and Fu 2014). The empirical investigation by 
Yang et al. (2014) found that, compared to airports without vertical arrangements with airlines, those 
with arrangements tend to handle more passengers and aircraft movements, have more gates but lower 
unit costs, and are more likely to be under public ownership. These empirical findings appear to be 
8 In recent years, formal price regulation has been removed for all major airports in New Zealand and Australia, 
and for some medium sized airports in the United Kingdom. A “light-handed” regulation regime has been 
introduced instead, where airport price and service quality are monitored but not directly regulated (Yang and Fu 
2014). However, capacity investments have not been formally examined in this emerging literature. Littlechild 
(2012b) noted that “the Australian light-handed approach is yet to be fully tested with respect to agreements on 
major investments.” 
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broadly consistent with our analytical results. 
 
We would like to caution readers that the model in this paper considered symmetric airlines only. In 
practice, dominant carriers often have substantial market power at their hubs, where airline 
competition might be better modeled as a Stackelberg game instead of a simultaneous game (see 
Sarmento and Brandao 2013 for an analysis using the Stackelberg formulation without demand 
uncertainty). With demand uncertainty however, Stackelberg competition needs to assume a specific 
rule of airline outputs allocation when airport capacity is binding. In the aviation industry, airport slot 
allocation has been fairly ad hoc despite established guiding principles of “grandfather rights”, “use it 
or lose it” rule, and “new entrant” rule. Future studies on specific airport markets may test the 
capacity/output allocation schemes being used, and such studies would offer valuable insights into 
this important issue.  
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Appendix. Numerical Simulation Results 
 
This section presents the results of some numerical simulations. These numerical simulations are 
carried out to test if for a particular value of capital saving δ, whether there are feasible values of s 
that can lead to incentive compatible agreements for both the airport and the airlines. For 
mathematical tractability, simulations presented below are carried out for scenarios when 𝑥 = 0, 𝑥 =1, b = 1, c = 0 and h = 0. Following graphs in Figure A1 depict the feasible areas of investment / 
revenue sharing proportion s in the case of a profit-maximizing airport. 
 
 
r = 0.3          r = 0.5         r = 0.7 
 
Figure A1. Feasible areas of s at different values of parameters  𝛿 and r  
in the case of a profit-maximizing airport 
 
Following graphs in Figure A2 depict the feasible areas of parameter s in the case of a welfare-
maximizing airport. Note since vertical arrangements (as presented by s) has no effects on social 
welfare, the feasible areas are determined mainly by signatory airlines’ incentive compatible condition, 
so long as corresponding airport charges (i.e. 𝜔) satisfy the conditions specified in Proposition 4.  
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r = 0.3          r = 0.5         r = 0.7 
 
Figure A2. Feasible areas of s at different values of parameters  𝛿 and r 
in the case of a welfare-maximizing airport 
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